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This symposium grew out of a workshop organized by
the European University Institute, Florence in 2013. The
main motivation of this endeavour is to think systemati-
cally about the role of agency in global governance
within the collective action perspective. Collective action
is at the core of governance and policy studies (Ostrom,
1998). Institutions, as rules of behaviour facilitating and
restricting actors’ interactions, influence the initiation, the
sustenance and the success of collective action (North,
1990). However, the structural bent in the institutionalist
research program has not adequately addressed, and
sometimes even ignored, the role of leaders in the emer-
gence, working and efficacy of institutions.
Leadership can be exercised by individuals as well as
organizations. This symposium focuses on political
leadership exercised by organizational actors – state,
international organization and private authority organiza-
tion – and how this political leadership mitigates
collective action problems and thereby shapes gover-
nance outcomes.
Leaders can be viewed as political entrepreneurs who
bring together actors with different preferences and
interests with the objective to facilitate the collective
pursuit of a common agenda (Schelling, Schneider and
Teske, 1992; Moravcsik and Katzenstein, 1998; Hix and
Høyland, 1999). The other actors participating in collec-
tive action might pay heed to leaders because leaders
can supply positive or negative incentives (Burns, 1987).
Sometimes, actors placed in specific organizational roles
emerge as leaders because, unlike their predecessors,
they are willing to exercise the power and authority that
the organizational position vests in them. Leaders need
not always have dramatic persona and lead the charge
sitting on a beautiful stallion! They can be humdrum,
routine actors that seek to deploy available resources in
creative ways to facilitate collective tasks.
Our focus is on the role of organizational actors (and
sometimes individuals in these organizations) in resolv-
ing collective action problems. Much of the literature
attributes collective action problems to either structural
attributes of the problem (the nature of the game such
as cooperation or coordination problems) or the prefer-
ences/attributes of the actors involved (such as the dis-
tribution of benefits and costs). The role of specific
organizational actors in resolving collective action issues
remains underexplored (hegemonic stability theory
being a notable exception). This symposium explores
how specific organizational actors work within these
structural constraints within a specific institutional con-
text and change either the nature of the game or the
calculus of actors facing this game – that is, exert
leadership.
We focus on how organizational actors, state and non-
state, might exercise leadership at the regional and/or
global level in the context of specific problem structures,
macro-economic conditions and decision making rules.
Further, these papers examine how their effectiveness is
shaped by resources at their command and the strategies
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they are able to employ to persuade, incentivize, or
coerce actors towards a particular solution.
In particular, this symposium highlights how strategic
interactions shape the exercise of leadership, i.e. how
actors with specific preferences over outcomes strategi-
cally interact with other actors with different preferences
in varying institutional contexts. These interactions are
examined in the context of different types of collective
action problems, some involving distributive or redistrib-
utive issues while others focus on problems of coordina-
tion and enforcement. Importantly, they emphasize the
importance of a variety of resources that may be used in
exercising leadership: material, positional/formal author-
ity, informational and ideational. Leaders may employ
merely transactional skills (in which the distribution of
power among the involved actors is not altered) or they
may use transformational skills (in which underlying
actors’ capabilities, resources, and/or preferences for spe-
cific outcomes are altered). The substantive policy prob-
lems central to the analysis are financial markets
regulation, environmental regulation, health and safety
regulation, technical norms, human rights norms and for-
eign and security policy. Finally, the papers examine
cases of both the successful and less successful exercise
of leadership.
The article by Barbara Koremenos, ‘The Role of State
Leadership in the Incidence of International Governance,’
explores the role of leadership in the incidence of inter-
national governance structures. The article focuses on
state leadership. The basic theoretical premise is that the
cooperation problem(s) underlying the cooperative
endeavour (or put differently, the underlying strategic
structure which reflects the joint and conflicting interests
of state parties) are key to understanding the necessity
of leadership with respect to the incidence of interna-
tional cooperation, that is, agenda setting by putting
forth the first draft of an international agreement
addressing the issue at hand and remaining in control of
subsequent drafts. The paper thus explores whether and
how much we can explain regarding the role and nature
of leadership in international cooperative endeavours
with a very simple focus on state interests and state
power. The theory is brought to life with cases from both
the security and human rights policy making realm. The
paper argues that powerful states do not unconditionally
take leadership roles in setting the agenda for the nego-
tiation of international agreements; they do so only
when their interests cannot be served without
leadership.
The article by Adrienne Heritier and Aseem Prakash, ‘A
Resource-based View of the EU’s Regional and Interna-
tional Leadership,’ examines variations in the EU’s suc-
cess to enact and enforce policies that lead to the
supply of regional or global public goods. It examines
the organizational leadership of the EU and explores
how it deploys its positional resource to enact laws with
the objective to supply public goods. Actors resist con-
tributing to public good provision if they view them-
selves as net losers in the bargain. Leaders wading into
regulatory politics need to assess the appropriateness of
their resource base in relation to their policy ambitions
and skilfully deploy these resources. Otherwise, they will
not be able to prevail over the ‘losers’ resisting the regu-
latory initiative. Empirically, the paper looks at two issue
areas: financial markets and environment. The financial
market cases pertain to the EU’s quest to provide regio-
nal public goods, while the environmental cases pertain
to the EU’s quest to provide regional as well as global
public goods by leveraging its authority to regulate
access to EU markets to nonEU firms. These cases reflect
instances of leadership success as well as failure. In the
financial market cases, the paper examines the Outright
Monetary Transactions (success) and the Banking Union’s
Single Resolution Mechanism/Pan European Deposit
Insurance (less successful) while the environmental cases
pertain to chemical regulation (success) and airline emis-
sions (failure). These cases reveal the EU’s skill and limita-
tions in deploying its positional authority to induce
contributions from EU member governments, EU firms
and nonEU firms to public good provision.
The article by Magnus Schoeller, ‘Explaining Political
Leadership: Germany’s Role in Shaping the Fiscal Com-
pact,’ explores why and how political leaders emerge,
and, once in charge, how these leaders influence out-
comes. The paper proposes a theory of political leader-
ship which takes into account both the structural and
the behavioural aspects of this concept. It suggests that
a leader emerges if there is a supply of and demand for
leadership. While the supply depends on a leader’s
expected benefits, the demand is determined by the fol-
lowers’ status quo costs. The second step concerns a lea-
der’s impact. Political leaders influence outcomes by
translating their power resources into strategies. In addi-
tion to their command over resources, the leadership
success is also influenced by the heterogeneity of prefer-
ences of their followers, and the adaptability of the insti-
tutions to be changed. The paper applied this theory to
understand the role of Germany in the European Fiscal
Compact. It examines why Germany was able to emerge
as a strong leader in autumn 2011. While economic
resources facilitated Germany to influence the realization
of the Fiscal Compact, its leadership efforts were aided
by homogeneity of preferences of member states’ and
the low adaptability of the relevant institutions.
The fourth paper by Walter Mattli and Jack Seddon,
‘New Organizational Leadership: NonState Actors in
Global Economic Governance,’ questions the state-cen-
tred account of global leadership. While recognizing that
inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) supply leader-
ship in many venues of global governance given their
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regulatory competence, operational capacity and legiti-
macy to tackle cooperation challenges, sometimes they
lack the technical expertise and resources to address
complex cooperation challenges. Recognizing their limita-
tions, IGOs – frequently with state support – have
co-opted specific nonstate actors to help achieve their
goals. This study considers the distributional implications
of co-optation. It describes and explains why some types
of co-optation have led to a transfer or sharing of
authority and organizational leadership while other types
leave the status quo intact. The study concludes that
leadership in global governance is rapidly becoming
more diffuse in key economic areas.
Finally, the article by Angel Saz-Carranza, ‘Agents as
Broker: Leadership in Multilateral Organizations,’ explores
leadership in multilateral contexts. Using principal-agent
theory, the paper suggests that IGO leaders succeed
when they recognize that they act on behalf of specific
principals, and they must devise solutions that are
acceptable to the winning coalition of these principals.
Yet, contrary to the principal-agent approach, leaders do
not manipulate information problems by substituting
their preference for those of their principals. Further,
principals do not always know their preferences, or their
ordering. Thus, agents need to provoke principals’ prefer-
ences with the objective of helping them to articulate or
order these preferences. They seek to act as policy bro-
kers and construct a solution which is acceptable to
most. Yet, in this construction, they can sometimes
smuggle in their own preferences – but eventually, IGO
leaders recognize the limits of their power. The paper
examines two cases of successful leadership: NATO Sec-
retary General’s work during the organization’s enlarge-
ment process to the east during the late 1990s, and the
EU High Representative’s work in institutionally creating
the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy during the
first decade of 2000.
In conclusion, this symposium seeks to make four con-
tributions to the study of leadership in global gover-
nance. First, while describing different approaches to
leadership, it grounds itself in rational choice institution-
alism. In doing so, instead of invoking the role of cha-
risma or personality traits, it focuses on resources and
strategies actors in leadership roles deploy in specific
problem contexts. Second, we view leadership processes
as a problem solving exercise; specifically, solving collec-
tive action problems across multiple but nested arenas.
Third, the papers recognize the important role of power
– the ability to alter payoffs associated with different
strategies available to ‘followers’, as well as to change
the strategies available to them in the exercise of leader-
ship. Yet, they also recognize that leaders often need to
stitch together a coalition to solve a problem. To do so,
leaders may not be able to rely on power alone; nonco-
ercive strategies which involve persuasion are required
as well. Finally, while the exercise of leadership by states
is critical in the study of regional and global governance,
scholars must pay close attention to the role of nonstate
actors and networks as well.
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